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2 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spending1 Introduction
In a world where information ￿ ows and people move between regions, local
policy makers do not make their decisions in isolation, but need to consider
the in￿ uence of the surrounding local governments￿policies. This gives rise
to a situation where the local decision making is a⁄ected not only by the
situation in the own jurisdiction, but also by the other jurisdictions￿policy
decisions.
The economic literature distinguishes between two types of strategic
interaction: interaction in the form of competition for a mobile resource,
and interaction based on information spill-over.1 The ￿rst of these theories
recognizes that if local residents respond to di⁄erences in local policy by
moving, then local policy makers may want to adjust the local policy
decision in order to attract - or avoid to attract - certain residents to the
jurisdiction.2
In the second, information-based, theory, interaction stems from the
hypothesis that the voters of a jurisdiction evaluate the performance of
the local policy makers by comparison with the surrounding jurisdictions.
This in turn may induce the local policy maker to mimic the neighbours￿
policy, in order not to look bad in the comparison and be voted out of
o¢ ce. The idea is that the neighbours provide a yardstick against which
the voters evaluate the decisions made by the local policy maker, and the
model is hence referred to as the "yardstick competition" model.3
Theory hence describes two mechanisms that can give rise to stra-
tegic behaviour among local policy makers: the possibility of dissatis￿ed
residents (i) to move to another jurisdiction, or (ii) to vote for another
politician. In general, the literature on the former, migration-based, the-
ory has focused on competition for a mobile tax base (tax competition), or
competition to limit the in￿ ow of costly bene￿t prone individuals (welfare
competition).4 The second theory, yardstick competition, has predomin-
antly been applied to local tax policy 5, although some recent studies also
1See e.g. Brueckner (2003) for an overview of the di⁄erent theoretical models.
2See e.g. Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Gordon (2003) for theoretical models.
3See Besley and Case (1995) for the ￿rst description of the yardstick competition
model in the political economy-setting.
4See Brueckner (2000) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) for results of the empirical
literature.
5See e.g. Besley and Case (1995), Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) and
SolØ-OllØ (2003).
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In this paper I acknowledge that strategic behaviour may arise also in
other areas of local policy, namely in the local decision on how much to
spend on childcare, primary schooling and care for the elderly. In Sweden,
childcare has long been a local responsibility, and in 1991-92 a series of
reforms transferred the provision and ￿nancing for primary schooling and
care for the elderly from the national and county levels to the municipal
level.
Is the decision on how much to spend on these services likely to be
a⁄ected by the threat of residents to either move from the jurisdiction or
to vote the incumbent out of o¢ ce? I argue that there is reason for us to
believe that it might.
Let us ￿rst consider the case of competition for mobile residents. Is
it likely that the local spending policy for childcare, primary schooling
and care for the elderly is a⁄ected by strategic competition for residents
between local governments? This naturally hinges on the assumption that
there is Tiebout-migration in the sense that individuals tend to move
to municipalities with high quality public service - or at least that the
local policy makers believe that this is the case. There is some evidence
of Tiebout-type migration in Sweden: Dahlberg and Fredriksson (2001)
￿nd a positive relationship between local public service quality and the
residential choices of short-distance migrants.
The fact that the services in this study, childcare, schooling and care
for the elderly do not bene￿t all residents, but are targeted to families
with children and elderly respectively7, furthermore means that there is
scope for the local policy maker to use public service spending to attract
certain demographic groups to the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction that wishes
to attract more families and fewer elderly residents, may hence be temp-
ted to favor spending on childcare and schooling on the expense of care
for the elderly, and vice versa. A local policy maker may hence use pub-
lic service spending as a means to attract the desired population mix; by
allocating more (than the neighbours) to the services targeted to the desir-
able population group, and less (than the neighbours) to the less desirable
6See e.g. Revelli (2006), who ￿nds evidence of yardstick competition in the social
service provision of UK local authorities.
7Naturally, other residents may also enjoy indirect utility of these services, however,
the direct e⁄ects apply only to the users of the services.
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How about the second theory - strategic interaction based on the yard-
stick comparison by voters? Is this type of interaction likely to be present
in the services of the study? There are some factors that speak for this:
Childcare, schooling and care for the elderly are services that are import-
ant and visible to a large number of the residents of a jurisdiction. They
also constitute the lion￿ s share of the municipal budget. This suggests
that these services may be important in the voting decision of residents.
In addition, residents are likely to be informed about the quality of the
services in the own as well as in adjacent jurisdictions, which is another
important prerequisite for yardstick competition. It is hence motivated
to test for yardstick type interaction among local governments. In par-
ticular, I assume that the voters in a jurisdiction observe the quality of
childcare, schooling and care for the elderly that they get, given the tax
rate, compared to other jurisdictions, and use this comparison to evaluate
whether the local policy maker does a good job or not. This will be noted
by the politician, who will avoid to deviate too much from the neighbours￿
decisions, in order not to be punished in the coming election.
Based on the above hypotheses, this study will test for a spatial pattern
in municipal spending policy on childcare, primary schooling and care for
the elderly. In the baseline analysis, I will test for a spatial pattern, con-
sistent with strategic interactions, among jurisdictions that share border.
As will be discussed later, this is a simple and straightforward measure
that can be motivated from both theories. As a sensitivity analysis I
also use a set of neighbourhood de￿nitions that are closely related to the
respective theories, i.e. competition for mobile residents and yardstick
competition.
I will test for strategic interactions in the composite expenditure policy
of local governments, i.e. I allow for interaction to take place both in
expenditures on the same service category, and in expenditures on di⁄erent
categories of services. This makes sense if residents/voters care about the
allocation of resources between di⁄erent services, as well as how much
is spent on each category.9 Furthermore, while the previous literature
8There are several reasons for why the demographic mix could matter to the local de-
cision maker: the young and the old may di⁄er in the income level, and hence the income
tax base they provide, and they may incur di⁄erent types of costs on the jurisdiction.
Local labour market concerns is another potential reason.
9Two previous studies estimate strategic interactions in composite local policies: the
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uses aggregate expenditures, here, I test for interactions in the three main
expenditure items of the municipalities.10
The hypothesis that the local decision maker reacts on the spending
policy of the neighbouring jurisdictions is tested using data on Swedish mu-
nicipal spending on childcare, primary education and care for the elderly
over the period 1996-2005. I will use spending per potential user, de￿ned
as spending per individual aged 0-15 for childcare and education11; and
spending per individual aged 80 and older for care for the elderly, as a
measure of quality. While it is true that increased spending does not ne-
cessarily imply higher quality, the idea here is that a politician who wants
to increase the quality of a service, will probably do so by allocating more
resources to the service; i.e. by increasing the spending per potential user.
In addition, ￿nding alternative and observable measures of quality is not
trivial, especially for care for the elderly.
There is no Swedish study on strategic interactions in the municipal
expenditures that are analyzed in this study. There are however stud-
ies that test for interactions in other expenditures. Hanes (2002) uses
cross-sectional data for 1986 on the local rescue services of Swedish muni-
cipalities, and ￿nds a negative spatial pattern, consistent with free-riding.
Lundberg (2001) tests a similar hypothesis for municipal spending on re-
creational and cultural services over 1981-1990, and also ￿nds support for
the free-riding hypothesis. Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) ￿nd evidence of
a positive spatial pattern in the welfare bene￿t levels of the municipalit-
ies, using a panel of 283 municipalities over 1990-1994, which is consistent
with welfare competition. Finally, Aronsson, Lundberg, and Wikstr￿m
(2000) ￿nd evidence of vertical externalities between the county and the
municipal expenditures, using Swedish panel data over 1981-86. This sug-
gests that it is important to consider potential e⁄ects of county spending
when estimating interactions between municipalities.
Identi￿cation and estimation problems abound in studies of this type.
￿rst, Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2004), focuses at U.S. state policies to attract
￿rms to the locality, and the second, Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007), looks at U.S.
school district inputs.
10For previous studies, see e.g. Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993), Baicker (2005), Re-
doano (2003), Schaltegger and Zemp (2003), and SolØ-OllØ (2006).
11Adding spending for childcare and schooling to one category makes sense since both
services are targeted to children. In addition, doing so facilitated the estimations, as
discussed in section 3.
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decision a⁄ects my decision, which in turn a⁄ects theirs and so on - in-
validates the use of OLS. In this study, following Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), I use instrumental variables estimation to overcome this problem.
As shown by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) IV has the advantage of being
unbiased in the presence of spatial error correlation. I include a set of
municipality characteristics, as well as time and ￿xed e⁄ects to further
reduce the risk of bias due to spatial error correlation. Finally, I account
for dynamics by clustering on municipality.
The analysis is subject to the following sensitivity tests: First, as men-
tioned above, a set of alternative neighbourhood speci￿cations is used.
Second, the possibility of vertical interactions is accounted for through
testing for e⁄ects of county expenditure on municipal spending policy.
Third, a Cochrane-Orcutt-type transformation of the variables, suggested
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998), is performed. The idea is that this can
increase the e¢ ciency of the estimations.
The results give no clear support for a spatial pattern in the local policy
on childcare, primary education and care for the elderly. While there are
some signi￿cant coe¢ cients, especially in the regression on spending on
care for the elderly, the results are not robust enough to draw any con-
clusions. Using the alternative neighbourhood de￿nitions yielded no addi-
tional support for neither competition for mobile residents nor yardstick
competition.
The disposition of the remaining study is as follows: section 2 describes
the Swedish local public sector and section 3 the data used. Section 4 dis-
cusses the empirical speci￿cation and methodology, and section 5 presents
the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Swedish local public sector
The Swedish public sector is organized at three levels: municipal, county
and central level. There are 290 municipalities and 21 counties. The main
responsibility of the counties is the provision of health care. The mu-
nicipalities have traditionally been responsible for a vast range of public
services, such as social assistance, infrastructure and environmental regu-
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responsibilities of the municipalities are in the areas of education, child
care and care for the elderly.
An important prerequisite for strategic interaction to arise in these
services, is that the municipalities can in fact a⁄ect the quality of the ser-
vices. While there are national guidelines for the municipal provision of
childcare, schooling and care for the elderly, there is also signi￿cant room
for local decision making. The guidelines are most detailed when it comes
to primary schooling, where national regulation13 speci￿es the compre-
hensive goals and guiding principles, and provides the basic curricula and
the minimum hours of teaching. Within this framework, there is room for
the municipality to prepare an own plan for the practical organization and
resource allocation. A quick look at the data on the resource allocation in
the municipalities in 2005, shows important di⁄erences in for example the
teacher density and expenses for teaching material.14
The national regulations for childcare and care for the elderly provide
very general guidelines for the municipalities15, and there is no national
system for the control of the compliance with these. In the case of child-
care, the municipalities are themselves responsible for controlling that the
guidelines are ful￿lled.
The local decision power is considerable also on the revenue side. The
municipalities have the right to collect tax revenue in the form of a local
income tax and are free to set the tax level, given that they maintain a
balanced budget. The tax revenues account for around 70 percent of the
total municipal revenue - the rest is made up by central government grants
and user fees16. Until 1992 the central government grants were targeted to
speci￿c services, but since 1993 they are in general in the form of general
12Two municipalities, Malm￿ and Gothenburg, di⁄er from the rest in that they were
responsible for some of the services elsewhere provided by the counties until 1998-99.
They are kept in the data, since excluding them did not change the results.
13See law 1985:1100 (Skollagen), regulation 1994:1194 (Grundskolef￿rordningen), and
the National plan for education (Nationell skolplan Lpo 94).
14Per student expenses for teaching materials varies between SEK1000 (about $140)
and SEK5000 (about $700), and the average number of students per teacher varies
between 7 and 11.
15For childcare see law 1985:1100 (Skollagen), and for care for the elderly, see law
2001:453 (Socialtj￿nstlagen).
16This ￿gure is from 2002, see "Kommunernas Ekonomiska L￿ge 2003", published by
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions.
8 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendinggrants that can be used freely by the municipalities.
The fact that the municipalities are responsible for both the ￿nancing
and provision of a number of important services, makes Sweden a partic-
ularly interesting case for the study of spatial interactions in the policies
of local governments. As is illustrated in Figure 1, spending on childcare,
primary education and care for the elderly and disabled account for the
main part of the municipal budget.17 This means that the citizens and
the politicians are likely to have information about the cost and quality
of these services and are likely to care about the cost and quality, which
are important prerequisites for the hypothesis of this study.
Figure 1: Average per Capita Municipal Spending in 2003
Note: The Figure shows the distribution of the total municipal expenditures on
di⁄erent spending categories, given as the municipal average per user in 2003. Source:
Statistics Sweden.
As was mentioned in the previous section, an assumption for the hypo-
thesis of migration-driven strategic competition in spending on childcare,
primary education and care for the elderly, is that the demographic mix of
a municipality matters economically for the local policy maker. In Sweden,
however, as in many other countries, there is a system of equalization of
17It shall be noted, though, that education in Figure (1) also includes spending on
secondary and adult education.
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of the system is to give every municipality roughly equal conditions in
structural factors such as demography, climate etc. Needless to say, this
decreases the incentives for migration-based strategic competition. How-
ever, Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) ￿nd evidence of welfare competition,
and Edmark and ¯gren (2007) ￿nd evidence of tax competition among
Swedish municipalities, using data from the same period as this study.
This suggests that the equalization system may not totally eliminate the
incentives for strategic behavior of this type.
Finally, Revelli (2006) argues that in a multi-tiered government struc-
ture one should consider not only horizontal (between municipalities), but
also vertical (between municipalities and other levels of government) in-
teractions. In our setting, this means that it is potentially important to
include county spending in the regression equation. I will therefore also,
as a robustness test, include this variable in the regression. This is fur-
thermore motivated by the fact that Aronsson, Lundberg, and Wikstr￿m
(2000) ￿nd vertical externalities to be present using Swedish data during
1981-86.
3 Data
The data set of this study is a panel of 283 municipalities18 over 1996-
2005.1920 As stated above, I use the following variables on local public
expenditures: spending on childcare, primary education, and care for the
186 of the 290 municipalities have either merged with or seceded from another mu-
nicipality during the time period under study, and have hence been excluded from the
sample. In addition, the municipality of Gotland has been excluded since it is an island
for which it is naturally di¢ cult to de￿ne the set of neighbors.
19The data on spending on childcare and care of the elderly and disabled, as well
as the data on most explanatory variables, is collected from Statistics Sweden. The
exception is data on unemployment, which is from the Swedish Public Employment
Service (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen). Data on spending on primary schooling is from the
Swedish National Agency for Education (Skolverket), and data on county expenditures
is from The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges Kommuner
och Landsting).
20Using data before that period is restricted ￿rst for two reasons: First, a large part
of the provision of the services in the study were not provided by the municipalities
before the ￿rst years of the 1990. Second, the collection of data on primary school
spending changed in 1995, which means that data from the early years of the 1990s are
not comparable to the more recent years.
10 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendingelderly. I focus on spending per potential user, and de￿ne spending on
childcare and education as one category, since both of these services are
targeted to children.21 The number of potential users is de￿ned as the
number of individuals aged 0-15 for childcare and education, and as the
number if individuals aged 80 and older for care for the elderly (and dis-
abled). The data on municipal spending does not separate between spend-
ing on elderly and disabled, and thus also includes spending on disabled.
The analysis includes a large set of municipality-level covariates. In
order to control for di⁄erences in basic economic conditions, I include the
per capita municipal taxbase (taxable income), per capita central govern-
ment grants22, per capita long-term debt, unemployment, employment,
and the share of the population on welfare bene￿ts (denoted welfare in
Table 1), as well as per capita county expenditures. A dummy variable,
which takes the value one if the political majority is left-wing, is added
to the regression in order to capture political preferences23, and the log
of the population size is included in order to capture di⁄erences in re-
turns to scale. All covariates, except for the political dummy variable, are
lagged one time period. This makes sense since the local budget is decided
towards the end of the previous year, when the information available con-
cerns the previous years￿economic and demographic conditions. Finally,
as suggested in the previous section, I will also, as a robustness test, add
county spending as a covariate in the regressions in order to account for
possible vertical interactions between county and municipal expenditures.
I also control for unobserved municipality factors that stay ￿xed over
time by including municipality ￿xed e⁄ects. This is important in order to
control for factors such as the size of the municipality and climate, which
a⁄ect the cost of service provision.24 In addition, the analysis includes
21An alternative would be to have two separate categories for childcare and primary
schooling. However, when doing so I encountered problems related to weak instruments.
That is, when separating spending on childcare and schooling, the set of instruments
were not strong enough to separatedly identify the two ￿rst stage regressions. This
suggests that a large share of the variation in the instrumet set is common for the two
types of services, and that it is in this sense appropriate to estimate them together.
22The grants variable is made up by the sum of total grants, i.e. both equalizing
grants (equalizing the economic conditions across municipalities) and general grants.
The negative minimum value of this variable in Table 1 is due to the fact that some
municipalities end up as net payers when the equalizing grants are taken into account.
23We de￿ne the Left Party and the Social Democratic Party as left-wing parties.
24As is seen in Table 1 there are very large di⁄erences between the min and max
values in spending per potential user in the cases of both childcare and education, and
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Table 1 gives the average values for the variables over the period 1996-
2005. All pecuniary variables are de￿ ated to year 2002 monetary value.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 1996-2005
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Spending Childcare Education 2793 59030 7586 39582 92326
Spending Care Elderly 2825 230338 45398 109790 476036
Taxbase 2830 1110 184 740 2509
Grants 2830 8018 4432 -15399 23194
Long Term Debt 2775 10282 10118 0 73482
Unemployment (%) 2830 4.6 1.9 0.9 13.8
Employment (%) 2830 44.2 3.5 29.4 54.2
Welfare (%) 2820 5.2 2.2 0.42 16.3
Population 2830 31142 58511 2553 771038
Left 2830 0.4 0.5 0 1
County Spending 2532￿ 18225 2626 12445 23868
￿County spending only contains data for 1996-2004.
4 Empirical speci￿cation
The prediction to be tested in the empirical analysis is, as described in sec-
tion 1, that the own spending policy on childcare and primary education,
and on care for the elderly, is a function of the neighbouring municipalit-
ies￿spending policy. Assuming linearity, the prediction can be described






t + Xt￿1￿ + ￿t; k = c;e: (1)
In terms of notation, sk
t is a vector of the per user spending on category
k in period t, where c denotes childcare and education, and e care for
the elderly. W is a matrix that gives positive weight to the municipalit-
ies that are de￿ned as neighbours, i.e. a neighbour weight matrix (W is
care for the elderly. This suggests that controlling for ￿xed municipality e⁄ects may be
important.
25Similar speci￿cations are used in Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2004), who model
a situation where jurisdicitons compete for companies using a composite policy of local
tax rate, environmental standards and local public spending, as well as by Millimet and
Rangaprasad (2007) who test for strategic competition among school districts.
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t and Wsc
t hence give the average
of the neighbouring municipalities￿spending on care for the elderly, and
childcare and education, respectively. Xt￿1 is a matrix of municipality
characteristics that a⁄ect the spending policy and also includes a con-
stant term (since all municipality covariates contained in X, except for
the political dummy variable, are lagged, I use the subscript t ￿ 1).
The hypothesis that will be tested in the empirical section is that the
￿-coe¢ cients di⁄er from zero, i.e. a non-zero result is consistent with
the hypothesis of strategic interactions in local service spending. What
can we expect regarding the signs of the coe¢ cients? In a case with
only one policy instrument, we would in general expect to ￿nd positive
interaction coe¢ cients, provided that all local decision makers have similar
preferences.26 However, in our present case, with two spending categories,
the signs of the interaction coe¢ cients are unknown.27
Since both equations in the system described in (1) include the same
variables, no e¢ ciency gains are to be made by joint estimation. The
equations are therefore estimated one by one.
4.1 De￿nition of a municipality￿ s neighbours
The neighbour weight matrix W needs to be de￿ned ex ante based on
exogenous factors. As discussed in the introduction, the causes for stra-
tegic interaction in the migration- based theory is the potential migration
of the service-consuming residents, whereas in the yardstick competition
case it is the threat to be voted out of o¢ ce that gives rise to interaction.
In both of these cases, a prerequisite for interaction to occur is that res-
idents/voters, as well as policy makers, are informed about the policy of
other jurisdictions. A reasonable criterion for the de￿nition of neighbours,
which is often used in the literature, is hence to let the weight-matrix
re￿ ect the geographical proximity of the jurisdictions, since information
about service quality and cost is likely to be more easily available for
26I.e., we would expect the local policy maker to mimic the neighbours￿policy decision.
27Consider for example the situation where the objective of the policy maker is to
attract more residents - of any age - to the jurisdiction. Assume also that this can be
done either by increasing spending on childcare and education; on care for the elderly;
or on both. A neighbour￿ s decision to increase spending on, say childcare and education,
can then be met with a strategic decision to increase own spending on either the same or
the other (or both) spending categories, and can in this case hence result in interaction
coe¢ cients of either positive or negative sign.
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A simple weight-matrix, which captures these aspects, is to de￿ne
neighbours as the municipalities that share border. If we use wij to denote
the elements of matrix W, i.e. wij de￿nes the weight that municipality j
has as a neighbour of i, then we can de￿ne this weight-matrix as wij = 1 if
i and j share border and wij = 0 otherwise. This type of weight matrix is
common in the literature on strategic interactions, and has the advantage
of being exogenous in the sense that the risk of imposing the spatial pat-
tern that we want to observe, through the de￿nition of the weight matrix,
is small.
In addition to this geographical neighbourhood de￿nition, I de￿ne two
sets of additional weighting schemes, that are closely related to the theor-
etical frameworks.
First, in order to better capture the information aspect, I construct a
neighbour weight matrix that re￿ ects the coverage of local news papers.
In this case, we let wij = newspaperij￿coverageij, where newspaperij = 1
if i and j share a local newspaper, and coverageij = the sum of average
newspaper coverage of the local newspapers in j and wij = 0 otherwise2829.
Second, according to the migration-based theory, it is, naturally, reas-
onable to assume that interaction takes place among municipalities between
which migration is common. I hence let wij = migrij, where migrij is the
immigration from j to i in 1995. Under this de￿nition, municipality j:s
weight as a neighbour to i depends positively on the migration rate. In
the ￿rst of the two migration based matrices, I use data on migration of
all persons aged 16-65. This is intended to capture the overall migration
patterns between the municipalities. However, according to our hypo-
thesis, what really matters is the migration of those that are attracted
by good care of children and schooling, or care for elderly. I therefore let
the second of the migration based weight matrices be based only on the
migration of individuals with children aged 0-15. Unfortunately, we lack
28The data on local newspapers is from 1994, 1998 eller 2002 and is from Tidningss-
tatistik AB. We are grateful to Helena Svaleryd och Jonas Vlachos for having made it
available to us.
29This type of weight matrix was also used in Edmark and ¯gren (2007). We select all
newspapers that are given out at least six days a week. This leaves some municipalities
with no newspaper. For these we include newspapers that are given out less then six days
a week. There are two newspapers that have a national coverage, Dagens Nyheter and
Svenska Dagbladet. These are counted as local newspapers only for the municipalities
in the Stockholm county, since they cover local news in this region.
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this information in the weighting scheme.30 By using migration in 1995,
which is the year before the ￿rst year of our panel, we attempt to avoid
endogeneity in the de￿nition of neighbours. Since we expect migration
to be a⁄ected by the spending policies of the municipalities, it is possible
that using migration in later years could give rise to a spurious relation in
expenditure levels.
In all cases the weight matrices are row-standardized, i.e. they are
normalized so that the individual weights of a set of neighbours sum to
one. This facilitates the interpretation of the coe¢ cients, and enables
direct comparison of the coe¢ cients from speci￿cations using di⁄erent
weight matrices.
What results do we expect to obtain from the di⁄erent de￿nitions of
neighbours? The use of di⁄erent weighting schemes shall ￿rst and foremost
be seen as a robustness test of the results. However, they can also be seen
as a ￿rst indication of the type of strategic interaction. In particular,
this holds for the migration-based matrices: since these correspond to
the migration-based model to a higher degree, we expect interaction to
be stronger in these speci￿cations if competition for attractive residents
is driving interaction. Speci￿cally, if it is true that the municipalities
compete for the desired distribution of the young and the old, we expect a
stronger result when we use migration of the young to de￿ne neighbours.
4.2 Estimation issues
There are several issues to consider in the estimation of strategic interac-
tions in local spending decisions. In particular, we need to minimize the
risk for bias due to the simultaneity of the municipalities￿policy decisions,
and for bias due to spatial error correlation.
The simultaneity of the policy decision implies that using OLS to es-
timate equation (1) yields biased estimates (see e.g. Anselin (1988)). An
alternative to OLS, which is suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998), is to
use the neighbours￿characteristics to instrument for neighbours￿spending.
I follow this procedure and use the neighbours￿characteristics as instru-
ments, except for the political variable describing whether the municipality
is ruled by a left-wing majority. This is excluded from the instrument set
30The data on inter-municipal migration comes from the data base LOUISE, and was
provided by The Institute for Labor Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU).
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ous. The resulting set of instruments contain the neighbours￿values of:
the taxbase, central government grants, long-term debt, unemployment,
employment, population (in logs) and the share of population that receive
welfare bene￿ts, all lagged one time period.31 Using the lagged values of
the instrumental variables makes sense not only because of the fact that
the local budget decision is made towards the end of the previous year,
but also since this ensures the exogeneity of the instruments in terms of
there being no e⁄ect of local spending policy on the instruments.
The spatial error correlation problem can be thought of as an omitted
variable problem; i.e. we want to avoid that something that is omitted
from the spending equation, and that is correlated among neighbouring
municipalities, a⁄ects the estimates. According to Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), spatial IV regression is consistent also in the presence of spatially
correlated error terms. However, in order to further minimize the risk for
this type of bias, I add a set of covariates, including ￿xed e⁄ects and year
e⁄ects. This can also be seen as a measure to strengthen the case for our
instruments, since the instruments now only need to be exogenous condi-
tional on the set of covariates. Speci￿cally, the fact that all the variables
that are used as instruments are also included as covariates means that
the identifying variation that is used in the ￿rst stage of the IV-estimation
is conditional on the own characteristics, i.e. only the di⁄erence between
the own and the neighbours￿characteristics are used for identi￿cation.
This rules out any concern that the coe¢ cients for neighbours￿spending
merely mirror similarities among neighbours in the variables that are used
as instruments.32
An alternative to using instrumental variable technique to solve the
simultaneity-problem of equation (1) is to use a spatial lag maximum-
likelihood estimator (see Revelli (2006) for an overview of spatial ML-
models). This estimator will however not be used here, since it can be
computationally demanding, especially when the number of jurisdictions
is large and when the weight matrix is not symmetric in the sense that the
31It may seem strange to include both unemployment and emplyment in the estima-
tion, since these are likely to be correlated. However, we are interested in the prediction
power of the ￿rst stage, and not the individual e⁄ects of the instruments, and we include
both variables since this improves the prediction power.
32See e.g. Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999) for a discussion on this.
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computational burden, it can also be argued that the ML-estimator has
less potential to identify the spatial process in the error term separately
from spatial error correlation.
Yet another alternative, which is suggested by Fredriksson, List, and
Millimet (2004) and Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007), is to replace neigh-
bours￿policy variables with their lagged values. The idea is that this is
a simple way to get around the simultaneity problem, since it is not par-
ticularly likely that the neighbours￿past policy is a⁄ected by the own
current policy, and that OLS can hence be used to estimate the e⁄ects of
the neighbours￿lagged policy. However, while this solves the simultaneity
problem, the estimates are likely to be biased by spatial error correlation
if spatial shocks are persistent.
Finally, since there is evidence that the adjustment of municipal ex-
penditures in Sweden is sluggish (see e.g. Dahlberg and Johansson (2000)),
I will need to account for dynamics in the regressions. In our setting, this
implies that the residuals of equation (2) are likely to be serially correl-
ated. I take account of this by computing standard errors that are robust
for serial correlation of arbitrary form in the error term3435.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the regression analysis. The estimated
equation is obtained by adding jurisdiction-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, id, and a






t + Xt￿1￿ + id + year + ￿t; k = c;e: (2)
where k denotes the two di⁄erent spending categories that are included
in the analysis: childcare and primary education, and care for the elderly.
33When Kelejian and Prucha (1999) test the accuracy and time of spatial ML-
computation they encounter problems when the number of cross-sectional units is 400,
even though they use a symmetric weight matrix.
34The error covariance matrix is obtained by clustering on municipality (see Baum,
Scha⁄er, and Stillman (2003)).
35An alternative would be to include the lagged dependent variable in the estimations,
using an Anderson-Hsiao-type estimator. This would however mean that we would
lose observations from the early period of our data set, since these would be used as
instruments.
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separate regressions, one for each spending category k, and will include
the neighbours￿spending for both categories as explanatory variables in
all regressions.
The testable hypothesis of the theoretical set-up is that the ￿k-coe¢ cients
di⁄er from zero. In addition, they shall not exceed one in absolute value,
since a larger interaction coe¢ cient does not represent a stable interaction
process36.
As described in the previous section, I use the neighbours￿values of
the following variables to instruments for neighbours￿spending: taxbase,
central government grants, long-term debt, unemployment, employment,
population (in logs) and the share of population that receive welfare be-
ne￿ts, all lagged one time period. The same set of instruments is used in
all regressions.
5.1 Baseline regression
We start by looking at the results when using the simplest of our neigh-
bourhood de￿nitions, i.e. sharing border. The regressions include all
municipality variables, but not county expenditures. First, the ￿rst stage
results are shown in Table 2. The results show that all instruments (in the
table, these are indicated with an N) are individually signi￿cant in the re-
gression on neighbours￿spending on childcare and education (N Childcare
and Education), and all instruments but employment are individually sig-
ni￿cant in the regression on neighbours￿spending on care for the elderly
(N Care Elderly), which is comforting.
Table 3 shows the results from the IV-estimation of equation (2). For
the sake of comparison, the OLS-results are also given, although these,
as discussed in section 4, are not unbiased. The results for spending on
childcare and primary education are given in columns 1-2 and the results
for spending on care for the elderly in columns 3-4. The coe¢ cients for
neighbours￿spending per user are denoted N Childcare and Education and
N Care Elderly.
36This restriction applies to all row-standardized neighbour weight matrices, but not
to weight matrices that are not row-standardized (Anselin (1988)). Note that this
restriction is not imposed on the estimations.
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N Childcare and Education N Care Elderly
Debt t ￿ 1 .009 .054
(.011) (.072)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 2.654 22.883
(3.369) (15.05)
Grants t ￿ 1 .004 .402
(.073) (.376)
Unempl t ￿ 1 100.966 184.084
(87.322) (387.003)
Empl t ￿ 1 66.425 -346.348
(70.608) (418.974)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -116.058￿￿ -142.069
(55.434) (289.847)




N Debt t ￿ 1 -.049￿￿ .233￿￿
(.02) (.11)
N Taxbase t ￿ 1 21.028￿￿￿ 55.337￿
(4.532) (28.296)
N Grants t ￿ 1 .974￿￿￿ 2.051￿￿￿
(.118) (.769)
N Unempl t ￿ 1 270.197￿ -1619.824￿￿
(144.817) (768.272)
N Empl t ￿ 1 419.696￿￿￿ -88.253
(140.195) (743.802)
N Welfare t ￿ 1 -263.568￿￿ -1675.133￿￿
(123.17) (765.197)
N Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -23301.8￿￿￿ 69220.99￿￿￿
(4750.953) (24821.87)
Obs. 2751 2751
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation of arbitrary form. ***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively. Year and ￿xed e⁄ects are included in all regressions.
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Childcare and Education Care Elderly
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and .07 .078 -.225 -.981
Education (.061) (.185) (.284) (.986)
N Care Elderly -.009 .021 .249￿￿￿ .677￿￿
(.013) (.055) (.073) (.297)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.038￿ -.041￿ -.008 -.031
(.021) (.022) (.124) (.13)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 22.167￿￿￿ 20.881￿￿￿ 40.667 21.486
(4.703) (5.27) (29.136) (31.026)
Grants t ￿ 1 .998￿￿￿ .968￿￿￿ .91 .634
(.142) (.152) (.833) (.881)
Unempl t ￿ 1 29.956 28.774 -104.71 116.822
(159.012) (160.997) (794.325) (843.852)
Empl t ￿ 1 315.004￿￿ 324.422￿￿ 876.471 1297.219
(139.874) (157.642) (729.715) (821.279)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -190.463￿ -177.122￿ -1105.904 -959.298
(99.867) (103.528) (711.256) (703.004)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -16267.89￿￿￿ -18063.58￿￿￿ 33459.34 -32.379
(5036.767) (6184.495) (24056.27) (31285.21)
Left 430.186 419.44 -403.919 -804.928
(351.034) (361.573) (2415.638) (2430.278)
Cragg-Donald F 15.04 15.02
J-statistic 7.853 3.728
p-value J-stat 0.165 0.589
Obs. 2715 2715 2746 2746
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation of arbitrary form. ***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively. The J-statistic is the test of overidentifying restrictions.
Instruments: neighbours￿values of: taxbase, central government grants, long-term debt,
unemployment, employment, population (in logs) and the share of population that
receive welfare bene￿ts, all lagged one time period. Year and ￿xed e⁄ects are included
in all regressions.
We start by looking at the IV-estimates. The signs of the coe¢ cients
for neighbours￿spending are insigni￿cant and close to zero for the regres-
sion on spending on childcare and education. The corresponding coe¢ -
cients in the regression on spending on care for the elderly, are larger: A
negative coe¢ cient is estimated for neighbours￿spending on childcare and
education, while a positive coe¢ cient is given for spending on care for
20 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendingthe elderly, which suggests that the municipalities respond to changes in
neighbours￿spending mix with the same type of policy change. Only the
latter of the coe¢ cients is however signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
The common way of testing for instrument relevance, using the F-
statistic of the joint signi￿cance of the instruments in the ￿rst stage re-
gression, is not valid when there are multiple endogenous regressors. (see
e.g. Baum, Scha⁄er, and Stillman (2003) for a description of the problem).
Instead, we need to use other tests to judge whether the instrument set
is relevant. Baum, Scha⁄er, and Stillman (2003) suggests a comparison
of the partial R2 and the Shea partial R237 for the instruments. This is
not a formal test, but, as a rule of thumb, a large partial R2 and a small
Shea partial R2 shall make us suspicious that the instruments are lacking
su¢ cient prediction power to explain all the endogenous variables. This
is not the case in the regressions of Table 3, where the two measures are
identical down to the fourth decimal: 0.1467 for neighbours￿spending on
childcare and education and 0.0413 for neighbours￿spending on care for
the elderly.
Another test for instrument relevance is the Cragg-Donald F-statistic.
This is originally a test of underidenti￿cation, but can also be used for
testing for weak instruments by using the critical values computed by
Stock and Yogo (2002). It shall be noted, however, that this test statistic
and the related critical values are derived under the assumption of homo-
scedasticity, and it is not clear how well it performs when this assumption
is not ful￿lled. As can be seen in Table 3, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic
for the baseline regression is 1538. This is above the critical value39 and
hence rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments.
In addition to being relevant, the instruments need to be exogenous
in the sense that there shall be no direct e⁄ect of the instruments on the
dependent variable, other than through their e⁄ect on the endogenous
37This is a partial R
2-measure which takes the intercorrelation between the instru-
ments into account, see Shea (1997).
3815.02 or 15.04, as can be seen in Table 3. The di⁄erence is due to the fact that the
number of observations di⁄ers somewhat between the regressions on childcare and edu-
cation and care of the elderly, and that this also a⁄ects the computation of teststatistic
as I use the ivreg command in Stata.
39The critical value for two endogenous variables, allowing for a maximum relative
bias of 10% compared to OLS, and at the 5% signi￿cance level, is 8.78. According to
Stock and Yogo (2002), this value is comparable to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule
of thumb of 10 for the F-statistic in a regression with one endogenous variable.
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a test of instrument validity, does not reject the hypothesis of exogenous
instruments (see the Hansen J-statistic in the table). Note however, that
the validity of the full set of instruments cannot be tested, since the test
of overidentifying restrictions ex ante assumes that one of the instruments
is valid.
We then turn to comparing the IV-estimates with the OLS-results.
How do we expect these to di⁄er? While the simultaneity problem suggests
that the OLS-coe¢ cients will be biased upwards, in absolute value, the
OLS-coe¢ cients may also su⁄er from bias due to spatial error correlation,
which can be positive or negative depending on the sign of the correlation.
The relation between OLS and IV hence depends on the relation between
these sources of bias. Comparing the OLS- and the IV-coe¢ cients of the
interaction variables, we see that the OLS-estimates are in general smaller
in absolute value than the IV-counterparts. This could be due to negative
spatial error correlation. It shall however be noted that the 95%-con￿dence
intervals for the IV-estimates in most cases well cover the OLS-coe¢ cients.
Another interesting comparison can be made if we run the IV-regression
excluding the municipality-￿xed e⁄ects. The results from this speci￿ca-
tion, that are given in Table A.1, Appendix, are highly unrealistic in terms
of measuring strategic interactions. The coe¢ cient for neighbours￿spend-
ing on childcare and education, in the speci￿cation in column 4, is much
larger than one, which suggests that the coe¢ cient is picking up some ef-
fect other than strategic interaction. This suggests that municipality-￿xed
e⁄ects may be needed to control for spatially correlated variables that stay
￿xed over time and that are correlated with the instrumental variables.
The results furthermore indicate that the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects are im-
portant for the validity and relevance of the instruments; without ￿xed
e⁄ects the test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the hypothesis of in-
strument exogeneity in the regression on spending on childcare and edu-
cation. Furthermore, comparison of the Shea R2 and partial R2 indicates
weak instruments, which suggests that identi￿cation becomes signi￿cantly
weaker as ￿xed e⁄ects are excluded. Using deviations over time as identi-
fying variation is therefore the proper approach.
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5.2.1 Varying the neighbourhood de￿nition
The regressions using the border-based de￿nition of neighbours yielded
support for an e⁄ect of neighbours￿spending policy on own spending on
care for the elderly, but no e⁄ect on spending on childcare and education.
Are these results robust to varying the way we de￿ne neighbours? In order
to test this we re-estimate equation (2) using the alternative de￿nitions
of neighbours that were described in section 4. The results for the media-
based weight matrix, Wmedia, is given in column 2. The results for the
weight-matrix based on migration of all persons aged 16-65, Wmigr, are
shown in column 3 in Tables 4 and 5, and the results when using only
migration of persons with children aged 0-15, Wmigr015, are shown in
column 4. The results from the border-based speci￿cation, Wborder, are
repeated in column 1 of the tables for ease of comparison.40
Comparing the results from the di⁄erent speci￿cations in Table 4, we
see that the media- and the migration-based neighbourhood speci￿cations
yield results that are qualitatively similar to the border-based speci￿cation
in the regression on spending on childcare and education: The e⁄ect of
neighbours￿spending policy is insigni￿cant for both categories of spending
irrespective of the de￿nition of neighbourhood.
For the regression on spending on care for the elderly and disabled,
in Table 5, the coe¢ cient on neighbours￿spending on care for the eld-
erly turns insigni￿cant as the alternative neighbourhood speci￿cations are
used. The coe¢ cient on neighbours￿spending on childcare and education
is negative as in the border-based speci￿cation, but becomes unreasonably
large, over one in absolute value, for the migration-based speci￿cations.
This is however only signi￿cant in one of the speci￿cations, Wmigration,
and then only at the 10 percent level. The results in Table 4 and 5 hence
give no additional support for the theories of strategic interactions.
Regarding the validity of the instruments, the Hansen J-statistic sup-
ports the exogeneity of the instruments in all speci￿cations, except for
the migration-based speci￿cation in column 3, Table 4, when spending on
childcare and education is the dependent variable. The relevance of the in-
struments is supported for all speci￿cations (the Cragg-Donald F-statistic
40Note that the instruments - i.e. the neighbours￿ covariates - are also weighted
according to the di⁄erent neighbourhood weight matrices.
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partial R241).
Table 4: IV regression, Di⁄erent neighbour weight matrices
Childcare Education
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and .078 -.029 .075 .013
Education (.185) (.185) (.236) (.223)
N Care Elderly .021 -.074 .135 .13
(.055) (.061) (.097) (.098)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.041￿ -.041￿￿ -.04￿ -.039￿
(.022) (.02) (.023) (.023)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 20.881￿￿￿ 23.722￿￿￿ 18.307￿￿￿ 18.147￿￿￿
(5.27) (4.925) (5.361) (5.156)
Grants t ￿ 1 .968￿￿￿ 1.003￿￿￿ .917￿￿￿ .934￿￿￿
(.152) (.142) (.161) (.158)
Unempl t ￿ 1 28.774 15.625 37.76 39.333
(160.997) (160.971) (165.008) (165.261)
Empl t ￿ 1 324.422￿￿ 331.431￿￿ 331.751￿￿ 333.674￿￿
(157.642) (150.196) (151.887) (155.031)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -177.122￿ -166.597 -186.649￿ -183.599￿
(103.528) (101.443) (105.686) (104.667)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -18063.58￿￿￿ -15484.34￿￿￿ -22281.44￿￿￿ -21739.74￿￿￿
(6184.495) (5391.413) (6118.678) (6007.824)
Left 419.44 304.293 462.708 483.587
(361.573) (365.297) (401.842) (404.857)
Cragg-Donald F 15.04 12.97 17.82 14.42
J-statistic 7.853 8.148 10.376 9.203
p-value J-stat 0.165 0.148 0.065 0.101
Obs. 2715 2705 2715 2715
Note: See Table 3.
41For the two migration-based speci￿cations both the Shea partial R
2 and the partial
R
2 are about 0.09 for the ￿rst stage on neighbors￿spending on childcare and education,
and are about 0.05-0.06 for the ￿rst stage on neighbors￿spending on care of the elderly.
The corresponding ￿gures for the media-based speci￿cation are around 0.04 and 0.06,
respectively.
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Care Elderly
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and -.981 -.396 -2.172￿ -1.849
Education (.986) (1.086) (1.252) (1.218)
N Care Elderly .677￿￿ .598 .699 .63
(.297) (.379) (.437) (.467)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.031 .053 -.005 -.006
(.13) (.124) (.126) (.125)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 21.486 35.635 32.177 31.227
(31.026) (30.967) (30.311) (31.621)
Grants t ￿ 1 .634 1.198 1.295 1.292
(.881) (.8) (.849) (.912)
Unempl t ￿ 1 116.822 227.982 -42.655 22.313
(843.852) (819.976) (776.779) (779.311)
Empl t ￿ 1 1297.219 963.592 1084.145 1059.052
(821.279) (757.501) (704.331) (725.697)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -959.298 -1385.383￿ -1102.433￿ -1124.255￿
(703.004) (708.034) (650.527) (674.115)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -32.379 28137.48 27278.5 31197.52
(31285.21) (27332.92) (24993.13) (23924.9)
Left -804.928 65.358 406.114 395.115
(2430.278) (2587.703) (2385.284) (2429.104)
Cragg-Donald F 15.02 12.97 17.82 14.42
J-statistic 3.728 2.490 2.055 6.164
p-value J-stat 0.589 0.778 0.842 0.291
Obs. 2746 2705 2715 2715
Note: See Table 3.
5.2.2 Adding county expenditures
So far, we have included only municipality-speci￿c covariates in the regres-
sions. However, Aronsson, Lundberg, and Wikstr￿m (2000) ￿nd support
for the hypothesis that county expenditures and municipal spending are
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either substitutes or complements for the local decision maker. Includ-
ing county expenditures may therefore be important in order to correctly
estimate inter-municipal interactions (see e.g. Revelli (2006)).
In general, the same endogeneity problem applies here as in the case
of interactions between municipalities, i.e. if municipality spending also
a⁄ects the county spending decisions, then county spending will be endo-
genous, although, since county is the larger unit42, this should be a smaller
problem than in the case of municipality-wise interaction. Since the aim
here is merely to test the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of the
variable, we will include county expenditures without accounting for po-
tential endogeneity. It shall however be noted that its coe¢ cient shall not
be interpreted as a causal e⁄ect.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results including county expenditures for
the border-, media- and migration-based weight-matrices. For the sake
of brevity, only the coe¢ cients for neighbouring municipalities￿spending
and county spending are shown. (The results for all covariates are shown
in Tables A.2 and A.3, Appendix).
Table 6: IV regression, Including county expenditures
Childcare and Education
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and .098 -.017 .035 -.035
Education (.212) (.229) (.253) (.236)
N Care Elderly .02 -.066 .085 .105
(.058) (.062) (.106) (.105)
County costs .227 .068 .266 .299
(.202) (.218) (.211) (.212)
Municip covariates yes yes yes yes
Cragg-Donald F 12.95 7.40 11.20 9.73
J-statistic 4.619 6.950 7.482 6.676
p-value J-stat 0.464 0.224 0.187 0.246
Obs. 2420 2411 2420 2420
Note: See Table 3.
42There are 290 municipalities and 21 counties in Sweden - hence on average about
14 municipalties per county.
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Care Elderly
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and -1.244 -.632 -2.441￿ -2.162
Education (1.168) (1.265) (1.378) (1.327)
N Care Elderly .838￿￿￿ .552 1.001￿￿ .818
(.316) (.369) (.492) (.519)
County costs -1.386 -1.293 -1.555 -1.708
(1.409) (1.507) (1.17) (1.231)
Municip covariates yes yes yes yes
Cragg-Donald F 12.89 7.40 11.20 9.73
J-statistic 2.993 2.545 3.402 8.450
p-value J-stat 0.701 0.770 0.638 0.133
Obs. 2451 2411 2420 2420
Note: See Table 3.
As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7, the results change somewhat when
county expenditures are included. The coe¢ cients on neighbours￿spend-
ing stay insigni￿cant in all speci￿cations in the regression on spending on
childcare and education in Table 6. In the regression on spending on care
for the elderly (Table 7), the coe¢ cients are larger, and are over one in
many speci￿cations. In the migration-based speci￿cation, both coe¢ cients
of neighbours￿spending are over one in absolute value, and signi￿cant at
the 10 and 5 percent levels. This is an unreasonable result which suggests
that the coe¢ cients may be picking up the e⁄ect of some omitted variable.
The coe¢ cient on county spending is positive in the regression on
spending on childcare and education, and negative in the regression on
care for the elderly, but is insigni￿cant in all speci￿cations.
Although, as commented earlier, the coe¢ cient on county expenditures
shall not be interpreted as a causal e⁄ect, it is nevertheless interesting
to compare result in Table 7, with the ￿ndings in Aronsson, Lundberg,
and Wikstr￿m (2000). They ￿nd a positi ve relation between county and
aggregate municipal expenditures, suggesting complementarity, using data
over 1981-86. Since that period, the municipal responsibilities for care
for the elderly have increased, due to the previously mentioned reform
in 1992. An interesting topic for future research would be to test if the
sign of the vertical interactions have also changed after this. Guiding
IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spending 27from the negative, although insigni￿cant, coe¢ cients in Table 7, one could
suspect county expenditures (which mainly consists of medical services)
and municipal spending on care for the elderly to be substitutes.
The Cragg-Donald F-statistic and the Shea partial R2 are very similar
to Tables 4 and 5 of the previous section43, supporting the instrument
relevance in all speci￿cations, except for the media-based speci￿cation,
where the Cragg-Donald F-statistic falls just below the critical value and
where weak instruments in this case might be a problem.
5.2.3 Transforming the variables to increase e¢ ciency
The results obtained in the above sections over-all yield very weak evid-
ence for strategic interactions in the spending decision on care for the
elderly, childcare and education. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) however
suggests that the e¢ ciency of the estimations can be increased by using
an alternative estimator, where the variables are transformed in order to
take potential spatial error correlation into account. The idea is that in
models of spatial interactions, we are likely to experience spatial correl-
ation in the error term due to spatially correlated shocks, and that this
correlation contains information that could be utilized in the estimation
procedure. This section tests if applying this estimation procedure to the
data increases the e¢ ciency of the estimations.
The following description follows Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Kelejian
and Prucha (1999). Let us start by de￿ning WX￿
t as the instrument set,
and let Ht = (Xt￿1;WX￿
t￿1) denote the resulting instrument matrix (that
is used in the ￿rst stage regressions). Second, I assume that the error term
is described by the following process:
￿t = ￿W￿t + ut, (3)
where ut is a vector of independently distributed error terms. That is,
the error term of equation (1) is correlated with the error terms of the
neighbouring municipalities.44 The idea is to transform the variables of
43The Shea partial R
2 and the partial R
2 are both around 0.12 in the border-based
regression on neighbors￿spending on childcare and education, and 0.04 in the regression
on neighbors￿spending on care for the elderly. The corresponding ￿gures for the media-
based speci￿cation are around 0.03 and 0.06, and for the migration-based speci￿cations
around 0.06 and 0.05.
44We assume that the weight matrix for the spatial process in the error term is the
same as that of the dependent variable.
28 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendingthe second stage taking into account spatial error correlation in the form of
(3). Following Kelejian and Prucha (1999), I estimate ^ ￿ using non-linear
least squares, and use the predicted coe¢ cient to transform the variables
in the following manner:
~ Zt = Zt ￿ ^ ￿WZt; ~ st = st ￿ ^ ￿Wst; (4)
where Z = (Wst;Xt￿1) and st denotes service spending.
IV is then applied to the transformed data. The resulting estimator is
the following:
￿

















The estimator in equation (5) is applied to the baseline regression, us-
ing the border-based neighbourhood criterion. In order to facilitate the es-
timations, I replace the missing values in the dataset with the municipality-
wise mean over the period. Table 8 shows the results for neighbours￿
spending when the variables are transformed in the above described man-
ner, (IV transformed). For the sake of comparison, the results from using
ordinary IV on the same dataset (with no missing values) are also shown.45
The full set of covariates, are included in the regressions, although here
only the coe¢ cients for neighbours￿spending policy are shown (the results
for all coe¢ cients can be seen in Table A.4, Appendix).
As can be seen in Table 8, the results of the estimation on the trans-
formed variables are very similar to the results of the regression on the
untransformed variables in Table 3. Neighbours￿spending has no signi￿c-
ant e⁄ect on own spending on childcare and education, while neighbours￿
spending on care for the elderly has a positive signi￿cant e⁄ect on own
spending on the same category. According to the results in Table 8, using
the transformation suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) did thus not
qualitatively change our results. This is in line with recent Monte Carlo
results for the estimator, which suggest that the e¢ ciency-gains to be
made from using the estimator are limited in small samples (see Kelejian,
Prucha, and Yuzefovich (2004)).
45As can be seen in Table 8, the results are very similar to the results of the unbalanced
panel in Table 3.
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ures, Border-based weight matrix
Childcare and Education Care for Elderly
IV IV transf IV IV transf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare 0.049 0.116 -0.851 -0.798
and Educ [ 0.180 ] [ 0.182 ] [ 0.979 ] [ 0.930 ]
N Care Elderly 0.015 0.003 0.643￿￿￿ 0.776￿￿￿
[ 0.054 ] [ 0.052 ] [ 0.292 ] [ 0.250 ]
Municip covar yes yes yes yes
^ ￿ -0.392 -0.403
Obs. 2380 2380 2380 2380
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation of arbitrary form. ***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively. Instruments: neighbours￿values of: taxbase, central government
grants, long-term debt, unemployment, employment, population (in logs) and the share
of population that receive welfare bene￿ts, all lagged one time period. Year and ￿xed
e⁄ects are included in all regressions.
The NLS-estimates of ^ ￿ are also given in the table. The negative values
of the estimates suggest negative spatial error dependence.
For the alternative neighbourhood speci￿cations, the NLS-estimation
of ^ ￿ proved unstable in many cases46. No results for the transformed
variables are therefore given for these speci￿cations.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, the results largely reject the hypothesis of strategic interac-
tion in local spending on childcare, primary education and care for the
elderly. While there are some signi￿cant coe¢ cients, especially in the re-
gression on spending on care for the elderly, the results are not robust
enough to be interpreted as evidence for strategic interaction. Speci￿c-
ally, while the border-based baseline speci￿cation for spending on care
for the elderly indicate a positive e⁄ect of neighbours￿spending on care
for the elderly, using the alternative neighbourhood de￿nitions yielded no
additional support for the theories of strategic interaction. Furthermore,
46Unrealistic values for ^ ￿ were estimated in some cases, or the results were not robust
for small changes in the starting values.
30 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendingcoe¢ cients larger than one in absolute value were given in some of the
alternative neighbourhood speci￿cations.
The aggregate results hence gives no robust evidence of strategic inter-
actions in childcare, primary schooling and care for the elderly. However,
it may be that the dependent variable that is used in this study, spending
(per potential user) is not a relevant measure for service quality. While
alternative quality measures for the time period under study are not eas-
ily found, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions have
recently started to produce open evaluations of the relative performance
of the public service in all Swedish municipalities.47, providing additional
measures on the quality of local public services. Rather than establish-
ing that strategic interactions are not an issue in the types of services of
this study, the results may be due to the di¢ culties of capturing quality-
di⁄erentials when using expenditure data, and better possibilities to test
for such interactions may be given in the future.
47The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions started to publish yearly
open quality comparisons for primary schooling and care for the elderly in 2007 (see
"￿ppna J￿mf￿relser 2007 - Grundskola", and "￿ppna J￿mf￿relser 2007 - ˜ldreomsorg"),
and will, in cooperation with the The National Board of Health and Welfare, work to
develop these further.
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34 IFAU ￿Strategic competition in Swedish local spendingA Appendix
A.1 Baseline IV no municipality ￿xed e⁄ects
Table A.1: Baseline regression without ￿xed e⁄ects
Childcare and Education Care Elderly
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and .469￿￿￿ .561￿￿￿ 1.215￿￿ 4.613￿￿
Education (.059) (.172) (.525) (1.941)
N Care Elderly -.004 -.004 .825￿￿￿ .634￿￿￿
(.008) (.022) (.087) (.207)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.006 -.01 -.174 -.235
(.018) (.018) (.159) (.178)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 20.731￿￿￿ 18.305￿￿￿ -35.956 -88.296￿￿
(3.543) (4.143) (21.975) (35.259)
Grants t ￿ 1 .89￿￿￿ .787￿￿￿ -.839 -3.028￿
(.126) (.152) (.999) (1.626)
Unempl t ￿ 1 -51.244 -109.935 4655.295￿￿￿ 3585.592￿￿
(183.344) (192.139) (1707.959) (1763.242)
Empl t ￿ 1 61.638 34.165 4191.543￿￿￿ 4200.267￿￿￿
(116.34) (133.673) (1037.598) (1225.657)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -43.821 -28.145 -1158.331 -441.338
(94.228) (107.356) (918.303) (972.302)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 463.096 461.102 -1632.402 -1286.629
(360.783) (357.592) (2392.802) (2489.017)
Left 1131.723￿￿￿ 979.387￿￿ 9114.321￿￿￿ 4128.145
(414.566) (450.688) (3500.161) (5074.422)
Cragg-Donald F 35.95 36.34
J-statistic 15.296 1.352
p-value J-stat 0.009 0.929
Obs. 2715 2715 2746 2746
Note: See Table 3. Fixed e⁄ects are however excluded in the regressions in Table A.1.
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Table A.2: IV regression, Including county expenditures
Childcare and Education
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and .098 -.017 .035 -.035
Education (.212) (.229) (.253) (.236)
N Care Elderly .02 -.066 .085 .105
(.058) (.062) (.106) (.105)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.035 -.035￿ -.033 -.033
(.023) (.02) (.022) (.023)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 19.792￿￿￿ 22.196￿￿￿ 19.109￿￿￿ 18.575￿￿￿
(5.615) (5.234) (5.448) (5.357)
Grants t ￿ 1 .939￿￿￿ .956￿￿￿ .937￿￿￿ .947￿￿￿
(.154) (.142) (.16) (.158)
Unempl t ￿ 1 27.881 12.871 40.194 44.367
(163.125) (163.763) (165.883) (166.766)
Empl t ￿ 1 217.447 213.8 217.329 216.422
(173.037) (167.031) (164.727) (168.082)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -174.518 -174.996 -191.724￿ -189.895￿
(112.703) (106.823) (108.303) (108.096)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -15765.26￿￿ -12929.23￿￿ -18052.32￿￿￿ -18288.96￿￿￿
(6940.9) (5712.656) (6444.467) (6081.03)
Left 420.256 321.644 437.59 472.853
(368.805) (371.539) (379.257) (389.363)
County costs .227 .068 .266 .299
(.202) (.218) (.211) (.212)
Cragg-Donald F 12.95 7.40 11.20 9.73
J-statistic 4.619 6.950 7.482 6.676
p-value J-stat 0.464 0.224 0.187 0.246
Obs. 2420 2411 2420 2420
Note: See Table 3.
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Care Elderly
Wborder Wmedia Wmigr Wmigr015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and -1.244 -.632 -2.441￿ -2.162
Education (1.168) (1.265) (1.378) (1.327)
N Care Elderly .838￿￿￿ .552 1.001￿￿ .818
(.316) (.369) (.492) (.519)
Debt t ￿ 1 -.071 .022 -.036 -.041
(.137) (.125) (.128) (.127)
Taxbase t ￿ 1 18.614 35.747 32.883 32.801
(33.173) (32.914) (31.604) (32.76)
Grants t ￿ 1 .548 1.148 1.226 1.243
(.889) (.807) (.861) (.918)
Unempl t ￿ 1 146.513 263.845 -84.682 43.797
(836.879) (783.638) (756.697) (766.071)
Empl t ￿ 1 1194.01 703.632 683.364 664.378
(963.84) (887.585) (843.564) (876.37)
Welfare t ￿ 1 -1022.801 -1539.9￿￿ -1312.48￿ -1356.353￿
(758.867) (739.619) (686.248) (715.025)
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -17989.67 25068.19 20427.74 28329.07
(35275.31) (28973.56) (27047.76) (25191.43)
Left -945.967 108.453 786.898 806.25
(2371.256) (2426.293) (2249.147) (2294.201)
County costs -1.386 -1.293 -1.555 -1.708
(1.409) (1.507) (1.17) (1.231)
Cragg-Donald F 12.89 7.40 11.20 9.73
J-statistic 2.993 2.545 3.402 8.450
p-value J-stat 0.701 0.770 0.638 0.133
Obs. 2451 2411 2420 2420
Note: See Table 3.
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Table A.4: Kelejian and Prucha IV regression, Border-based weight matrix
Childcare and Education Care for Elderly
IV IV transf IV IV transf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Childcare and 0.049 0.116 -0.851 -0.798
Education ( 0.180 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.979 ) ( 0.930 )
N care for elderly 0.015 0.003 0.643￿￿ 0.776￿￿￿
( 0.054 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.292 ) ( 0.250 )
Debt t ￿ 1 -0.045￿￿ -0.039￿ -0.061 -0.041
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.122 )
Taxbase t ￿ 1 20.830￿￿￿ 21.655￿￿￿ 22.706 20.724
( 5.193 ) ( 5.186 ) ( 30.645 ) ( 26.991 )
Grants t ￿ 1 0.978￿￿￿ 0.949￿￿￿ 0.633 0.657
( 0.149 ) ( 0.156 ) ( 0.867 ) ( 0.830 )
Unempl t ￿ 1 35.476 120.435 46.187 91.989
( 159.061 ) ( 152.133 ) ( 833.042 ) ( 731.396 )
Empl t ￿ 1 306.644￿ 325.814￿￿ 1325.677 969.841
( 157.291 ) ( 144.750 ) ( 820.334 ) ( 712.725 )
Welfare t ￿ 1 -182.854￿ -254.289￿￿ -732.091 -727.223
( 101.343 ) ( 101.352 ) ( 701.298 ) ( 641.644 )
Ln Pop t ￿ 1 -18690.225￿￿￿ -18371.477￿￿￿ 10728.280 1414.449
( 6155.095 ) ( 6333.887 ) ( 31432.996 ) ( 29221.325 )
Left 437.615 332.145 -1228.647 -992.321
( 383.861 ) ( 386.621 ) ( 2383.212 ) ( 2206.521 )
^ ￿ -0.392 -0.403
Obs. 2380 2380 2380 2380
Note: See Table 7.
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